2.3 Comprehensive frameworks of skills

Some researchers have attempted to define nonacademic forms of cognition within broader models of personal competence (Greenspan, 1981; Greenspan and Driscoll, 1997; Greenspan and Granfield, 1992) or human functioning (D. Ford, 1987, 1994; M. Ford and D. Ford, 1987; M. Ford and Maher, 1998). We briefly review two of these frameworks here.

2.3.1 Greenspan and driscoll's model of personal competence

Greenspan and his colleagues (Greenspan, 1981; Greenspan and Driscoll, 1997; Greenspan and Granfield, 1992) view personal competence as comprising the skills involved in attaining goals and solving problems, whereas cognition refers to the subcomponent of these skills involved in thinking and understanding. A recent version of their model (Greenspan and Driscoll, 1997) consists of four broad domains of competence: physical competence, affective competence, everyday competence, and academic competence. These broad domains are further divided into eight subdomains. Physical competence consists of organ (e.g., vision, heart functioning) and motor competence (e.g., strength, coordination). Affective competence consists of temperament (e.g., emotionality, distractibility) and character (e.g., gregariousness, social orientation). Everyday competence includes practical cognition (i.e., the skill to think about and understand problems in everyday settings) and social cognition (i.e., the skill to think about and understand social problems). Academic competence involves conceptual cognition (i.e., the skill to think about and understand problems of an academic or abstract nature) and language (i.e., the skill to understand and participate in communications).

Greenspan and Driscoll's (1997) model takes into account Cantor and Kihlstrom's (1989) suggestion that social cognition forms a link between cognition and personality. The tendency to view personality as a disposition and cognition as a skill has led most researchers to treat the constructs as separate. The Greenspan-Driscoll model recognizes that social competence consists of both intellective and nonintellective components.

2.3.2 The living systems framework

In the Living Systems Framework (LSF) of human functioning and development (D. Ford, 1987, 1994; M. Ford and D. Ford, 1987), cognition is viewed as the effective pursuit of goals within some setting or domain of activity (M. Ford and Maher, 1998). The key aspect of the LSF is the behavior episode, a context-specific, goal-directed pattern of behavior. Everyday life consists of a continuous series of behavior episodes. Behavior episodes can involve motor or communicative activity, information seeking, or thought processes. Multiple behavior episodes form a behavior episode schema (BES) that directs attention and guides thoughts, feelings, and actions, and consists of both declarative and procedural knowledge. The combination of a number of BESs allows for flexibility in dealing with various types of everyday problems, which is considered a major component of social and practical cognition (M. Ford, 1986).

Neither the Greenspan model nor that of M. Ford and Maher (1998) seems to capture emotional cognition as defined by Mayer et al. (in press). It is likely that Greenspan and Driscoll would consider emotional cognition as they view social cognition, that is, at the intersection of personality and cognition. Both these models, and the approaches to social and emotional cognition discussed above, recognize the importance of nonacademic or nontraditional cognition in determining success in life. This view also forms the basis of Sternberg's (1997a) aptly named theory of successful cognition.