• statutes are unitary, so I only have a single text to work with - and I must in that text control the inherent potential for proliferating multiple interpretations (a potential made more evident everyday as legislation is accessed using internet search tools - as it is read in ever more new and exotic ways - a point made entertainingly by David Hayes at the recent CIAJ conference in Ottawa).

The demands made by these two limiting factors are evidently inconsistent. Any attempt at intimacy - at directly speaking to any particular reader or class of readers, must, to a certain extent, be feigned. I cannot limit my conversation to that reader or those readers alone.

The logical conclusion of the first limit is a different text of the law for each significant different audience. But we currently have no protocols of reading to allow such multiple texts to operate concurrently. We must continue to draft our legislative stories in a singular, linear fashion, until reforms other than of a linguistic nature are made to the legal system.

3. The limits of plain language

I emphasise that my remarks about plain language law, critical though they may seem, are not intended to discredit the plain language project. I fully support its goal of making the law more accessible to those affected by it. I have every respect for my colleagues at this conference striving to find new ways to express complex legal concepts in simpler legal documents. I have little time for the sort of reactionary criticism offered by Mr Bennett. However, after plain language legislation's admirable record of achievement in a short period of time, I think it worth taking a little time to reflect on and acknowledge some limits of the project.