Inherent in the theory of memory as mental representations is the idea that the mind is something quite separate from the brain. However, enactionists such as Foley (1997, p. 90) argue that memory, and hence, the mind are the brain^{Endnote 6} and the body. In this vein and in concert with extensive cognitive neuroscience research exploring explicit and implicit memory systems (Abel et al., 1995; Schacter, 1992; Tryon, 1993a; Willingham, Salidis, & Gabrieli, 2002), connectionism^{Endnote 7} (Tryon, 1999), and the prominent psychologists studying posttraumatic stress disorder, Bessel A. van der Kolk and Rita Fisler (1995), enactionism suggests human beings know very little on a conscious, explicit, or reflective basis. Thus, most of what we know is stored in the body as sensory information that has not been processed consciously. Such knowledge is referred to as implicit, tacit, subconscious or pre-conscious, or pre-reflective^{Endnote 8}—and perhaps the site of knowledge, such as domestic abuse or the touch that evokes panic or nausea, that does not fit into a person’s worldview. Enactionism explains why the body, through its entire network of associations (see endnote 7), remembers the touch associated with rape or incest. And it explains why only the mind (and not necessarily with full consciousness)—with its memories of an abundance of positively construed touch—can counteract the body’s automatic preparation to flee from affectionately offered sexual touch it subconsciously evaluates as sexual “threat.” Therefore, enactionism, more completely than mental representations, contributes to understanding the apparent contradiction of a person living with domestic abuse without comprehending it explicitly as abuse and, I argue, accounts most fully for the possibility of revising and altering one’s physical health and psychological outlook after domestic abuse.