If an individual is dissatisfied with the delivery, by any government department or institution, of those rights, that person can lodge a complaint with our office. We will investigate all complaints, and I make findings, public reports and recommendations to the responsible minister. We hear from over 1,000 persons a year, and approximately 200 complaints are fully investigated each year.

The effect of those rights has been very interesting and beneficial. It may be worthwhile to consider whether some, or all of the principles should be extended. My interest in that possibility was heightened when, in February 1980, the Honourable Senator Jacques Flynn, who was then the Minister of Justice, asked me to do a special study into the use of the Social Insurance Number. The study was extended by the Honourable Jean Chretien, and it took us almost one year to complete it.

The study was designed to examine the extent to which the Social Insurance Number is collected and used, the purpose for which it is used, and whether the number serves as a data-linkage device. I was asked to examine possible threats from the use of the number, and the implications of regulation or prohibition of the collection and the use of the number. The minister's question presented me with a Pandora's Box! The number was found everywhere; the problem became larger than the question implied.

I came to the conclusion that the Social Insurance Number is not the real problem. But, secret and inappropriate data linkage is, and we discovered that many people believed that the Social Insurance Number would provide the key that would allow access to all records about the person behind the number.

If this were so, there would be reason for alarm, because total concentration of all information about a person is not desirable and may be dangerous. Access to all information may give the recipient too much power and, if the information ends up in the wrong hands, it may expose the subject of the information to financial, psychological or physical harm.

Data linkage may be good or bad; undisclosed linkage may even be for the benefit of the individual. But why should it take place without the individual's consent or knowledge; why should it happen without public debate to balance the interests involved?

The danger perceived as arising from the widespread use of the Social Insurance Number is, of course, inherent in all data, or combinations of data that serve to identify an individual. But the reaction to the number is symbolic, and it should alert us all to the issue of what kind of data linkage should be permitted or tolerated. I suggest that data linkage and use of personal information collected from an individual in certain transactions clearly defined in law, should take place only after full disclosure of the intended use by the collector and the informed consent of the subject of the information.

Some people value their informational privacy; others are not concerned because, as they say, they have nothing to hide. I would take issue with that attitude, because I believe few people would leave their door open to allow a thief an opportunity to enter their homes, and the one who steals personal information may cause you a greater loss than the one who takes your bonds and jewels.

The ultimate danger, of course, is something that most Canadians refuse to think about and, if I hadn't lived with it, I wouldn't think about it either. In case of war, terrorism, or occupation by a foreign power, total dossiers on all individuals, stored in one place, can threaten our civil liberties. I need only mention personal records that indicate race, religion, or political opinions and sexual orientation.

The main recommendation I made as a result of the Social Insurance Number study was directed towards the unauthorized, secret use of information. The effect of my proposal, if enacted, would be this: a person or institution collecting personal information in exchange for benefits or services would be forced to disclose its proposed uses. Other uses not authorized in law, or disclosed or consented to later, would be illegal. The protection would cover information given to another, to governments, to a doctor, to an insurance broker, or to a bank, etc.; it would cover disclosure compelled by law (as, for example, census information); it would cover information stored in home computers.

I proposed the enactment of a new criminal offence, to be called an offence against the privacy of another, and that it should prohibit the willful, undisclosed acquisition, alteration, use, processing, manipulation, transmission, or destruction of personal data, not otherwise authorized by law, or by the subject. The prohibition could apply to personal data:

1. provided to obtain a benefit or service;
2. provided under compulsion of law; or
3. placed in the custody of another for storage and the
   exclusive use of the depositor.

Or to put it otherwise, at time of collection of the information, the intended uses will be discussed, bargained for and agreed to; all other uses, except those specifically authorized by law, would be illegal. The essential ingredients to prove the suggested offences against the privacy of another would be: the identity of the accused; the provision of the data by the subject; the nature of the transaction (that is, the acquisition, alteration, use, processing, manipulation, transmission, or destruction of the data); the absence of disclosure, consent or authority in law; and finally, that the transaction was the willful act of the accused.

To deal with personal data collected from individuals before the enactment of any offence, it would be necessary to provide that uses not consistent with those implicit in the original purpose for which the data had been provided, be against the law as of the date of enactment of the offence. In other words, consent to uses not consistent with the original purpose, would have to be obtained from the subject of the information.