By all accounts, there is mounting interest in Canada's labour movement for a more substantial role for workers and their elected representatives in pension governance. Traditionally, this has been a priority for many private and public sector union leaders who have argued that it is their obligation to represent pension plan members who are also union members and negotiate crucial decisions about benefit values, funding policy, indexation and surplus issues. Over time, this priority has broadened to encompass the topic of investing and managing pension assets.
Above all, many Canadian unions, union centrals and union locals seek greater employee/plan member inclusion and input in pension investment decision-making processes and structures. The CLC and some of its provincial affiliates have made this a more explicit aim. This is also true for several national unions, such as the Canadian Union of Public Employees, the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, the National Union of Public and General Employees and its provincial affiliates, the United Steelworkers of America and the Service Employees International Union. For them, this may be termed a "threshold" issue, meaning that it must be resolved before a labour voice in investment decisions can be adequately heard.Endnote 17
At present, the participation of Canadian unions and workers in decision-making relevant to all aspects of pension governance is limited. Fiduciaries in only four of the 100 largest pension funds in the country characterize theirs as wholly union-directed (more exist in the category of below $1 billion in total assets).Endnote 18 Though incidence of joint trusteeship has certainly grown since the 1980s, the sharing of governing fiduciary roles and responsibilities between employers and employees remains largely confined to multi- employer funds in the private sector and a handful of large public sector funds (where an employee's contributory status is more pervasive).
In addition, while Canadian legislative jurisdictions provide for some measure of employee/plan member control on advisory committees to governing and managing fiduciaries, such bodies tend to be highly unsatisfactory to labour. This is due to such perceived structural defects as inception requirements, the low number of requisite employee/plan member representatives and the fact that member selection is not always under the direct control of those being represented. This complaint is also heard from labour in Quebec, despite its more rigorous system of broad and mandatory institutional coverage.Endnote 19
This said, some pension advisory committee arrangements are notable for having been organized to function fairly well. In British Columbia, for instance, a bona fide joint process is underway. This includes equal numbers of employer and union appointees, with an independent chair, who are regularly consulted by trustees for large public sector pension plans and their money management institution - OCIO - in the province. A similar model is observed in Nova Scotia. It should be added, however, that some unions involved in these bodies, such as the British Columbia Government Employees' Union, though supportive, have registered a preference for implementing joint trusteeship.Endnote 20
In another example, the presidents of the Fédération des travailleurs et travailleuses du Québec and the Confédération des syndicats nationaux sit as directors to the Caisse de dépot.
Not all Canadian unions place as much emphasis on influence over the investment and management of pension assets, at least with respect to advisory bodies or joint administrative arrangements, including joint trusteeship. This includes some unions affiliated with non-contributory, private sector pension plans. Alternatively, others exert control through the collective bargaining process. Where it is deemed necessary or beneficial, such direction can extend to specific investment decisions. A good example involves the National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada, or the CAW, who, in 1993 negotiations with Chrysler Canada, obtained agreement on an over $2 million pension asset allocation to co-operative and non-profit housing development in Ontario, subject to government fiscal partnership.Endnote 21