But of course, there are yet further problems for legal drafters. They must take care not only at the micro-level of words or phrases, but at the macro-level of legal concepts. A document must be effective to create the legal entity or concept the drafter intends. This may require the use of particular words, phrases or structures. For example, consider the lease/licence distinction. To create a lease, the tenant must be given the right to exclusive possession; otherwise a mere licence results. This is not to suggest that the phrase "exclusive possession" must be used; but it might well be prudent to do so. A New South Wales judge has said that in discerning whether a document creates a lease or a licence, a general imprecision of language can point to a licence rather than to a lease; so too can the labels the parties use (for example, "agreement" rather than "lease", and whether payments are described as "rent") and also - significantly for plain language drafters - the absence of technical words of grant12. Again, in the area of securities, failure to use the precise word "mortgage" could result in some lesser kind of security being created, with a consequent diminution in the remedies given to the lender. And yet again, when creating an easement or restrictive covenant, it is important to use language which shows that what is created is a proprietary right that runs with the land, not a mere contractual right that binds only the parties.

That said, none of these matters justifies using jargon for its own sake. None justifies perpetuating linguistic eccentricities that serve only to enhance mystique, not legal effect. And yet lawyers still introduce documents with "whereas". They "execute" them rather than sign them. They "demise" rather than lease. They require a tenant to "well and sufficiently repair" when "repair" will do. They declare something "null and void", when "void" will do. They insist on "shall" when the rest of the community uses "must".13 And so on. None of these hallowed words and phrases is a true term of art. All can be simplified, and some can be discarded completely.


12.

National Outdoor Advertising Pty Ltd v Wavon (1988) 4 BPR 973.

13.

On the use of "must" instead of "shall", see correspondence in the Australian Law Journal: (1989) 63 ALJ 75-78, 522-525, 726-728; (1990) 64 ALJ 168-169. For a more detailed survey, see Kimble, "The many misuses of Shall" (1992) 3 Scribes Journal of Legal Writing, 61-77. At least one Australian case has expressly recognised that "must" is quite sufficient to impose an obligation: South Australian Housing Trust v Development Assessment Commission (1994) 63 SASR 35 at 38.

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