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But of course,
there are yet further problems for legal drafters. They must take care not only
at the micro-level of words or phrases, but at the macro-level of legal
concepts. A document must be effective to create the legal entity or concept
the drafter intends. This may require the use of particular words, phrases or
structures. For example, consider the lease/licence distinction. To create a
lease, the tenant must be given the right to exclusive possession; otherwise a
mere licence results. This is not to suggest that the phrase "exclusive
possession" must be used; but it might well be prudent to do so. A New South
Wales judge has said that in discerning whether a document creates a lease or a
licence, a general imprecision of language can point to a licence rather than
to a lease; so too can the labels the parties use (for example, "agreement"
rather than "lease", and whether payments are described as "rent") and also -
significantly for plain language drafters - the absence of technical words of
grant12. Again, in the area of securities, failure to use the
precise word "mortgage" could result in some lesser kind of security being
created, with a consequent diminution in the remedies given to the lender. And
yet again, when creating an easement or restrictive covenant, it is important
to use language which shows that what is created is a proprietary right that
runs with the land, not a mere contractual right that binds only the
parties.
That said, none of
these matters justifies using jargon for its own sake. None justifies
perpetuating linguistic eccentricities that serve only to enhance mystique, not
legal effect. And yet lawyers still introduce documents with "whereas". They
"execute" them rather than sign them. They "demise" rather than lease. They
require a tenant to "well and sufficiently repair" when "repair" will do. They
declare something "null and void", when "void" will do. They insist on "shall"
when the rest of the community uses "must".13 And so on. None of
these hallowed words and phrases is a true term of art. All can be simplified,
and some can be discarded completely.
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12.
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National
Outdoor Advertising Pty Ltd v Wavon (1988) 4 BPR 973. |
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13.
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On the use of
"must" instead of "shall", see correspondence in the Australian Law Journal:
(1989) 63 ALJ 75-78, 522-525, 726-728; (1990) 64 ALJ 168-169. For a more
detailed survey, see Kimble, "The many misuses of Shall" (1992) 3 Scribes
Journal of Legal Writing, 61-77. At least one Australian case has expressly
recognised that "must" is quite sufficient to impose an obligation: South
Australian Housing Trust v Development Assessment Commission (1994) 63 SASR
35 at 38. |
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