I would like in this short paper to discuss the assumptions that lie behind the move away from time-honoured legal language and towards plain legal language. When the modern plain language movement was in its infancy, many of these assumptions were untested. We simply assumed that plain language was a "good thing". We had very little evidence to back up our assumptions. Now, however, I think we have the evidence - the evidence to give us confidence that our assumptions are justified.

What is plain legal language?

I should begin by asking: what do we mean by "plain language" in law, or (as it is usually called) "plain legal language"? "Plain language" is a term used by many, and I suspect its meaning varies considerably from user to user. By "plain language" I mean language that is clear and idiomatic - for those who write in the English language, it is modern, standard English.

For some, the term "plain language" carries connotations of "dumbing down" the language - a kind of Dick-and-Jane style of writing that panders to the lowest common denominator. But this is a misunderstanding of the true nature of "plain language", at least as practiced by skillful proponents. In skilled hands, plain language uses the techniques of the very best writers, to produce legal prose that communicates directly and effectively with its intended audience.